ETSI EN 304 618
CYBER; CRA; Essential cybersecurity requirements for password managers · vertical pack 0.1.0 · 105 clause-5 requirements
INTERIM DRAFT under open consultation — subject to substantial change before publication; approved versions come only from the ETSI Documentation Service. Not cited in the Official Journal: conformance confers NO presumption of conformity today.
This is a vertical pack: a product-category standard, published in full and evaluated alongside the horizontal CRA rule pack— it supplements that pack for one Annex III category, it does not replace it. Everything below — every requirement, applicability entry, assessment block, correspondence row, threat and draft defect — is rendered from the same file the assessment engine reads. Nothing is generated at answer time, so this page cannot drift from what the product evaluates.
The same data, machine-readable, is served at /api/pack/vertical?id=en-304-618 — fetch it, keep a copy, and diff it when the draft moves. Because the standard is a moving draft, the source card pins exactly which text this pack was built from, and the draft gaps card records the defects we found in that text rather than papering over them.
On this page: source & license · how it attaches · requirement index · full text · CRA correspondence · threats · draft gaps · how it's built
Source, license and attribution
- Source: https://labs.etsi.org/rep/stan4cra/en-304-618 (the ETSI Labs draft repository), commit
d3a3e0bf, retrieved 2026-09-02. - License: BSD-3-Clause, © ETSI. Redistributed with attribution as the license requires; the verbatim requirement text below is reproduced from the interim draft.
To be plain about what that means: the normative requirement and assessment text on this page is reproduced verbatim from the interim draft under the license above, with the required copyright notice, conditions and disclaimer preserved in full below. The draft is a consultation document, not an ETSI deliverable — approved versions of ETSI standards are available only from the ETSI Documentation Service, and nothing reproduced here confers any presumption of conformity.
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How this pack attaches
The pack applies to products classified under the CRA Annex III item “Password managers” (pack category id: important-1). Attaches to a product whose CRA classification matched the Annex III password managers item, or manually. The horizontal CRA pack keeps evaluating the product either way; this pack adds the category-specific requirements on top.
Scope (the draft’s own)
This standard focuses on password managers. These are designed to securely store
and retrieve passwords, locally on a device or on a remote server, with a view
to facilitate password management.
## 1.1 Password managers
Password managers can be built on top of secret managers and function as a
comprehensive management service.
When a password manager includes password rotation it transcends being just a
storage tool and becomes an active service that proactively manages credentials
over time, this makes it a management service rather than simply a storage tool.
## 1.2 What is a password
Passwords are typically associated with user accounts and are a form of secret
that users know and use to authenticate themselves to a system. They play a role
in secure authentication and access control and verify a user's identity or
authorisation to access a system or resource. They are integrated into
applications, systems and services to verify user identity during login
processes. The activity of using a password is the entering of this secret
information at authentication points to gain authorised access to protected
information.
## 1.3 Use cases
Password managers can be characterized along several dimensions that influence
how users interact with them and the benefits they provide. At a high level,
these tools address distinct user segments: solutions for individual use,
solutions for family groups that require selective sharing while preserving
privacy, and basic enterprise configurations in which credentials may be
injected into connections dynamically to provide a transparent experience for
end users.
Synchronization is a central point of differentiation. Some solutions
synchronize credentials across devices through general-purpose cloud services,
enabling access from any device associated with the user’s account. Others
provide synchronization that is native to the password manager itself, resulting
in a more integrated but potentially narrower ecosystem. A third category
comprises non-synchronized deployments that operate as resident or standalone
systems, retaining all credentials locally on a single device or within a
defined environment.
The deployment model also varies by where the solution resides in the technology
stack. Browser-integrated managers provide convenience for web authentication.
Operating system level managers offer deeper integration across applications and
services. Standalone managers operate as independent applications, typically
offering greater flexibility and feature breadth, while requiring separate
management by the user. The boundary between browser level and operating system
level solutions has become increasingly indistinct as platform integrations have
deepened.
On mobile platforms, this integration manifests differently across ecosystems.
Some provide a native keychain-style service with cloud-backed synchronization,
delivering a uniform experience across devices within that ecosystem. Others
adopt a more open model in which the password management provider may be
selected from multiple services through system APIs or plugins, increasing
choice but potentially creating ambiguity about which component is responsible
for managing credentials.
These distinctions reflect the evolution of password management from a basic
browser convenience to a mature security capability. Each approach entails
specific tradeoffs among convenience, security, and flexibility. For the
purposes of scope, this document considers solutions across these user segments,
synchronization models, and deployment models, with particular attention to the
interactions and overlaps among them.
Applicability (the draft’s own)
In accordance with the proportionality principle mandated by the CRA, this
clause defines representative use cases for password managers. These use cases
illustrate typical deployment contexts that influence the selection and
applicability of security requirements.
Each use case is associated with a general risk level, derived directly from the
application of the risk assessment methodology detailed in Annex A. This risk
management level serves as a foundational element for determining the stringency
of security requirements. While these use cases are representative, specific
deployment scenarios will necessitate a more granular and detailed risk
assessment, also guided by Annex A.
4.4.1 Universal Security Requirements
All password manager implementations, regardless of deployment model or use
case, SHALL implement the following baseline security controls:
- Fundamental Security Controls - Encryption at Rest: All stored
credentials and sensitive metadata SHALL be encrypted using approved algorithms
(minimum AES-256) with authenticated encryption modes
- Authenticated Access: Every access to the password store SHALL require explicit
authentication, with no bypass mechanisms permitted for convenience
- Secure Key Derivation: Master passwords SHALL be processed through computationally
intensive key derivation functions
- Memory Protection: Decrypted credentials SHALL be cleared from
memory immediately after use
- Transport Security: All network communications SHALL utilize TLS 1.3 or higher with
certificate validation
The 6 use cases
Applicability is declared per use case: the draft defines 6 product contexts, and each clause-5 requirement states, per use case, whether it is required. The index below renders every column; enabling the pack on an assessment means choosing one of these.
Personal Password Manager on User LaptopUC-PM1
Description: Individual consumer using password manager for personal
credential management across online services, financial accounts, and digital
subscriptions on their primary computing device.
Example Environments: - Home office laptop with mixed personal/professional
use - Personal MacBook with iCloud Keychain - Windows laptop with third-party
password manager - Linux workstation with open-source solution
Security Characteristics: Single user trust model; limited IT expertise;
consumer-grade threat profile; convenience prioritized with security defaults
Risk Level: MEDIUM (See Annex B.1)
Enterprise Private Cloud Password ManagerUC-PM2
Description: Organization-hosted password management infrastructure deployed
in private cloud or on-premises data center, providing complete control over
data residency and security implementation.
Example Environments: - VMware private cloud deployment - OpenStack
infrastructure - Kubernetes containerized deployment - Hybrid cloud with
sensitive data on-premises
Security Characteristics: Full organizational control; compliance with data
sovereignty requirements; integration with existing security infrastructure;
dedicated security team management
Risk Level: HIGH (See Annex B.2)
Cloud Password Manager with Local CachingUC-PM3
Description: Cloud-first architecture with intelligent local caching for
frequently accessed credentials, optimizing performance while maintaining
cloud-based management and backup.
Example Environments: - Sales team with mobile devices and intermittent
connectivity - International travelers requiring offline access - Branch offices
with unreliable internet - Emergency response teams in field operations
Security Characteristics: Selective sync based on access patterns; encrypted
cache with TTL; conflict resolution protocols; bandwidth-optimized
synchronization
Risk Level: HIGH (See Annex B.3)
Operating System Keychain IntegrationUC-PM4
Description: OS-native credential management leveraging platform security
features, kernel-level protection, and hardware security modules for system-wide
password management.
Example Environments: - macOS Keychain with TouchID/FaceID - Windows
Credential Manager with Windows Hello - Linux Secret Service with GNOME
Keyring - Android/iOS system credential stores
Security Characteristics: OS-level encryption; biometric authentication;
inter-application credential sharing; platform-specific security models
Risk Level: MEDIUM (See Annex B.4)
Family Password Manager with Parental ControlsUC-PM5
Description: Multi-user password manager supporting family groups with
hierarchical access control, allowing parents to manage children's passwords
while teaching security practices.
Example Environments: - Shared family computer with multiple user profiles -
Parent-managed passwords for children's educational accounts - Shared streaming
service credentials - Emergency access to family member accounts
Security Characteristics: Role-based access (parent/teen/child);
age-appropriate interfaces; shared vault separation; inheritance planning
features
Risk Level: MEDIUM (See Annex B.5)
Industrial OT Password ManagementUC-PM6
Description: Specialized password manager for operational technology
environments, managing credentials for industrial control systems, SCADA
networks, and critical infrastructure with air-gap requirements.
Example Environments: - Manufacturing plant floor systems - Power grid
control systems - Water treatment facility SCADA - Transportation system
controllers
Security Characteristics: Air-gapped operation mandatory; change control
workflows; dual-person authentication; audit logging for compliance; emergency
break-glass procedures
Risk Level: CRITICAL (See Annex B.6)
Requirement index
Every requirement in one place: the 105 clause-5 requirements with their per-use-case applicability. Ids link to the full verbatim text below; each row is addressable so a review can cite specific rows.
| Id | Requirement (first line) | UC-PM1 | UC-PM2 | UC-PM3 | UC-PM4 | UC-PM5 | UC-PM6 |
|---|
| 5.1 — Master Password Authentication |
| R1.1 | SHALL implement key derivation function (KDF) with minimum 100,000 iterations (PBKDF2) or equivalent computational cost | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R1.2 | SHALL enforce minimum master password complexity (12+ characters, multiple character classes) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R1.3 | SHALL implement exponential backoff for failed authentication attempts | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R1.4 | SHALL clear master password from memory immediately after use | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R1.5a | SHALL support multi-factor authentication as mandatory option | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R1.5b | SHALL mask password entry fields | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.2 — Password Database Storage |
| R2.1a | SHALL use symmetric block cipher approved encryption algorithm | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R2.1b | SHALL use unique salts per database | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R2.2 | SHALL implement authenticated encryption (AEAD) to ensure integrity | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R2.2b | SHALL implement secure key derivation separate from authentication | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R2.3 | SHALL use encryption for all network transmissions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R2.4 | SHALL implement countermeasures against side-channel attacks (constant-time operations, memory access patterns) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.3 — Auto-fill Functionality |
| R3.1 | SHALL validate exact domain match before auto-fill | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R3.2 | SHALL require explicit user interaction for credential insertion | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R3.3 | SHALL implement Content Security Policy (CSP) in browser extensions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R3.4 | SHALL maintain domain whitelist/blacklist capability | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.4 — Import/Export Functionality |
| R4.1 | SHALL provide encrypted export option as default | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R4.2a | SHALL validate and sanitize all imported data | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R4.2b | SHALL implement format validation and type checking | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R4.3 | SHALL securely overwrite temporary files | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R4.4 | SHALL require re-authentication for export operations | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R4.5 | SHALL log all import/export activities | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.5 — API/CLI Access |
| R5.1a | SHALL implement OAuth 2.0 or equivalent secure authentication | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R5.1b | SHALL use short-lived tokens with secure refresh mechanisms | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R5.2a | SHALL enforce rate limiting per endpoint | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R5.2b | SHALL implement principle of least privilege for API permissions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R5.3 | SHALL maintain comprehensive audit logs with tamper protection | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R5.4 | SHALL support API key rotation without service disruption | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R5.5 | SHALL implement token binding or proof-of-possession mechanisms | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.6 — Backup and Recovery |
| R6.1 | SHALL encrypt all backup data with same standards as primary database | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R6.2a | SHALL implement multi-factor recovery process | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R6.2b | SHALL implement time-delayed recovery with notification period | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R6.3 | SHALL generate cryptographically random recovery codes (minimum 128 bits entropy) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R6.4a | SHALL notify users of all recovery attempts | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R6.4b | SHALL limit recovery code usage attempts | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.7 — Password Generation |
| R7.1 | SHALL use cryptographically secure random number generator (CSRNG) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R7.2 | SHALL provide minimum acceptable bits of entropy for generated passwords | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R7.3 | SHALL allow user-defined generation parameters | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R7.4 | SHALL implement secure random seed initialization | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R7.5 | SHALL NOT store or log generated passwords before user acceptance | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R7.6 | SHALL implement constant-time generation to prevent timing analysis | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.8 — Workload Isolation |
| R8.1a | SHALL enforce process isolation using OS-level security boundaries | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R8.1b | SHALL prevent unauthorized inter-process communication | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R8.2 | SHALL implement separate memory spaces for each workload | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R8.3a | SHALL enforce network segmentation between administrative and user functions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R8.3b | SHALL monitor and alert on isolation violation attempts | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R8.4b | SHALL implement side-channel resistant isolation (cache partitioning, timing isolation) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.9 — Platform Integrity |
| R9.1a | SHALL implement code signing for all executable components | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R9.1b | SHALL perform runtime integrity checks on critical functions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R9.2 | SHALL use address space layout randomization (ASLR) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R9.3 | SHALL implement buffer overflow protections | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R9.4 | SHALL maintain cryptographic hashes of configuration files | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.10 — Platform Attestation |
| R10.1 | SHALL generate cryptographically signed attestation reports | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R10.2a | SHALL include all security-critical components in attestation | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R10.2b | SHALL support remote attestation verification | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R10.3 | SHALL use hardware-backed attestation where available | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R10.4a | SHALL implement attestation freshness mechanisms | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R10.4b | SHALL use mutual authentication for attestation protocols | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.11 — Administrative Authentication |
| R11.1 | SHALL enforce multi-factor authentication for administrative access | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R11.2 | SHALL implement certificate-based authentication option | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R11.3 | SHALL enforce session timeout and re-authentication | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R11.4a | SHALL use separate authentication credentials for administrative functions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R11.4b | SHALL implement account lockout after failed attempts | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.12 — Access Control |
| R12.1 | SHALL implement role-based access control (RBAC) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R12.2a | SHALL enforce least privilege principle for all operations | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R12.2b | SHALL validate authorization for each sensitive operation | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R12.3a | SHALL support granular permission assignment | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R12.3b | SHALL log all authorization decisions and violations | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R12.4 | SHALL implement atomic authorization checks to prevent TOCTTOU | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.13 — Data Confidentiality |
| R13.1 | SHALL encrypt all data at rest using AES-256 or equivalent | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R13.2 | SHALL use TLS 1.3 for all network communications | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R13.3 | SHALL implement perfect forward secrecy for communications | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R13.4a | SHALL clear sensitive data from memory after use | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R13.4b | SHALL disable caching of decrypted credentials | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.14 — Availability Protection |
| R14.1 | SHALL implement rate limiting on all interfaces | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R14.2a | SHALL enforce resource quotas per user/session | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R14.2b | SHALL implement automatic resource cleanup | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R14.3 | SHALL support graceful degradation under load | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R14.4 | SHALL maintain service availability monitoring | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.15 — Audit Logging |
| R15.1 | SHALL log all authentication attempts and outcomes | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R15.2 | SHALL log all credential access and modifications | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R15.3a | SHALL implement tamper-evident log storage | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R15.3b | SHALL support secure log export and archival | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R15.4a | SHALL implement log retention policies | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R15.4b | SHALL implement log rotation and size limits to prevent flooding | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.16 — Update Security |
| R16.1a | SHALL cryptographically sign all update packages | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R16.1b | SHALL verify signatures before applying updates | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R16.2 | SHALL implement secure rollback mechanisms | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R16.3 | SHALL maintain update audit trail | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R16.4 | SHALL include version checking to prevent downgrade attacks | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.17 — Configuration Security |
| R17.1a | SHALL protect configuration files with appropriate permissions | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R17.1b | SHALL require authentication for configuration changes | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R17.2 | SHALL validate all configuration inputs | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R17.3 | SHALL maintain configuration change history | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R17.4 | SHALL support configuration integrity monitoring | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.18 — Secure Defaults |
| R18.1a | SHALL enforce secure defaults without user intervention | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R18.1b | SHALL require password change on first use | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R18.2 | SHALL disable unnecessary features by default | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R18.3 | SHALL use strongest available cryptography by default | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R18.4 | SHALL provide security hardening guide | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| 5.19 — Time Synchronization |
| R19.1 | SHALL use authenticated NTP or equivalent protocol | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R19.2a | SHALL validate time source authenticity | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R19.2b | SHALL detect and alert on significant time changes | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R19.3 | SHALL maintain monotonic clock for security events | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| R19.4 | SHALL implement time synchronization monitoring | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
● = required for that use case · — = not required. Use cases: UC-PM1 Personal Password Manager on User Laptop · UC-PM2 Enterprise Private Cloud Password Manager · UC-PM3 Cloud Password Manager with Local Caching · UC-PM4 Operating System Keychain Integration · UC-PM5 Family Password Manager with Parental Controls · UC-PM6 Industrial OT Password Management.
5.1 — Master Password Authentication
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
Threat:
- T1.1: Offline brute force attacks against encrypted vaults
- T1.2: Online credential stuffing and password spraying attacks
- T1.3: Shoulder surfing and keylogger-based credential theft
- T1.4: Memory scraping attacks targeting master password in RAM
Risk: HIGH - Compromise of master password provides complete access to all stored credentials. Likelihood elevated due to targeted nature of password manager attacks.
R1.1 — SHALL implement key derivation function (KDF) with minimum 100,000 iterations (PBKDF2) or equiv…Clause 5.1
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement key derivation function (KDF) with minimum 100,000 iterations (PBKDF2) or equivalent computational cost
Applicability
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R1.2 — SHALL enforce minimum master password complexity (12+ characters, multiple character classes)Clause 5.1
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce minimum master password complexity (12+ characters, multiple character classes)
Applicability
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R1.3 — SHALL implement exponential backoff for failed authentication attemptsClause 5.1
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement exponential backoff for failed authentication attempts
Applicability
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R1.4 — SHALL clear master password from memory immediately after useClause 5.1
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL clear master password from memory immediately after use
Applicability
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R1.5a — SHALL support multi-factor authentication as mandatory optionClause 5.1
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support multi-factor authentication as mandatory option
Applicability
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R1.5b — SHALL mask password entry fieldsClause 5.1
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL mask password entry fields
Applicability
Capability: Password manager employs master password authentication mechanism for primary access control.
Condition: Master password authentication mechanism exposed without adequate protection against brute force or credential attacks.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.2 — Password Database Storage
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
Threat:
- T2.1: Database exfiltration through file system access
- T2.2: Man-in-the-middle attacks during cloud synchronization
- T2.3: Cryptographic downgrade attacks
- T2.4: Side-channel attacks against encryption implementation
Risk: CRITICAL - Database contains all user credentials. Impact is catastrophic if encryption is compromised.
R2.1a — SHALL use symmetric block cipher approved encryption algorithmClause 5.2
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use symmetric block cipher approved encryption algorithm
Applicability
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R2.1b — SHALL use unique salts per databaseClause 5.2
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use unique salts per database
Applicability
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R2.2 — SHALL implement authenticated encryption (AEAD) to ensure integrityClause 5.2
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement authenticated encryption (AEAD) to ensure integrity
Applicability
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R2.2b — SHALL implement secure key derivation separate from authenticationClause 5.2
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement secure key derivation separate from authentication
Applicability
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R2.3 — SHALL use encryption for all network transmissionsClause 5.2
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use encryption for all network transmissions
Applicability
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R2.4 — SHALL implement countermeasures against side-channel attacks (constant-time operations, memory…Clause 5.2
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement countermeasures against side-channel attacks (constant-time operations, memory access patterns)
Applicability
Capability: Encrypted storage mechanism for password database (local storage or cloud synchronization).
Condition: Password database stored or transmitted with insufficient encryption or key management practices.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.3 — Auto-fill Functionality
Capability: Browser integration and automatic credential insertion into web forms.
Condition: Auto-fill mechanism operating without proper origin validation or user confirmation.
Threat:
- T3.1: Phishing attacks through lookalike domains
- T3.2: Clickjacking to trigger unintended auto-fill
- T3.3: Form injection attacks on compromised sites
- T3.4: Cross-site scripting (XSS) credential theft
Risk: HIGH - Auto-fill vulnerabilities enable credential theft at scale. Likelihood high due to prevalence of phishing.
R3.1 — SHALL validate exact domain match before auto-fillClause 5.3
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL validate exact domain match before auto-fill
Applicability
Capability: Browser integration and automatic credential insertion into web forms.
Condition: Auto-fill mechanism operating without proper origin validation or user confirmation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R3.2 — SHALL require explicit user interaction for credential insertionClause 5.3
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL require explicit user interaction for credential insertion
Applicability
Capability: Browser integration and automatic credential insertion into web forms.
Condition: Auto-fill mechanism operating without proper origin validation or user confirmation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R3.3 — SHALL implement Content Security Policy (CSP) in browser extensionsClause 5.3
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement Content Security Policy (CSP) in browser extensions
Applicability
Capability: Browser integration and automatic credential insertion into web forms.
Condition: Auto-fill mechanism operating without proper origin validation or user confirmation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R3.4 — SHALL maintain domain whitelist/blacklist capabilityClause 5.3
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain domain whitelist/blacklist capability
Applicability
Capability: Browser integration and automatic credential insertion into web forms.
Condition: Auto-fill mechanism operating without proper origin validation or user confirmation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.4 — Import/Export Functionality
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
Threat:
- T4.1: Plaintext credential exposure during export
- T4.2: Malicious data injection through crafted import files
- T4.3: Format confusion attacks
- T4.4: Temporary file forensic recovery
Risk: MEDIUM - Feature typically used infrequently but presents data exposure risk. Impact high if exploited.
R4.1 — SHALL provide encrypted export option as defaultClause 5.4
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL provide encrypted export option as default
Applicability
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R4.2a — SHALL validate and sanitize all imported dataClause 5.4
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL validate and sanitize all imported data
Applicability
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R4.2b — SHALL implement format validation and type checkingClause 5.4
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement format validation and type checking
Applicability
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R4.3 — SHALL securely overwrite temporary filesClause 5.4
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL securely overwrite temporary files
Applicability
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R4.4 — SHALL require re-authentication for export operationsClause 5.4
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL require re-authentication for export operations
Applicability
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R4.5 — SHALL log all import/export activitiesClause 5.4
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL log all import/export activities
Applicability
Capability: Data portability features allowing credential import from and export to external formats.
Condition: Import/export operations handling sensitive data without adequate protection or validation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.5 — API/CLI Access
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
Threat:
- T5.1: Automated credential harvesting via API
- T5.2: Privilege escalation through API vulnerabilities
- T5.3: Token/session hijacking
- T5.4: Denial of service through resource exhaustion
Risk: HIGH - APIs present expanded attack surface. Automation enables rapid exploitation at scale.
R5.1a — SHALL implement OAuth 2.0 or equivalent secure authenticationClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement OAuth 2.0 or equivalent secure authentication
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R5.1b — SHALL use short-lived tokens with secure refresh mechanismsClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use short-lived tokens with secure refresh mechanisms
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R5.2a — SHALL enforce rate limiting per endpointClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce rate limiting per endpoint
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R5.2b — SHALL implement principle of least privilege for API permissionsClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement principle of least privilege for API permissions
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R5.3 — SHALL maintain comprehensive audit logs with tamper protectionClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain comprehensive audit logs with tamper protection
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R5.4 — SHALL support API key rotation without service disruptionClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support API key rotation without service disruption
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R5.5 — SHALL implement token binding or proof-of-possession mechanismsClause 5.5
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement token binding or proof-of-possession mechanisms
Applicability
Capability: Programmatic access interface for integration with external systems or automation.
Condition: API exposed without proper authentication, rate limiting, or audit logging.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.6 — Backup and Recovery
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
Threat:
- T6.1: Account takeover through weak recovery processes
- T6.2: Backup data exposure in less secure locations
- T6.3: Social engineering targeting recovery procedures
- T6.4: Recovery code interception or prediction
Risk: HIGH - Recovery mechanisms are frequently targeted as the weakest link. Impact equals full account compromise.
R6.1 — SHALL encrypt all backup data with same standards as primary databaseClause 5.6
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL encrypt all backup data with same standards as primary database
Applicability
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R6.2a — SHALL implement multi-factor recovery processClause 5.6
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement multi-factor recovery process
Applicability
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R6.2b — SHALL implement time-delayed recovery with notification periodClause 5.6
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement time-delayed recovery with notification period
Applicability
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R6.3 — SHALL generate cryptographically random recovery codes (minimum 128 bits entropy)Clause 5.6
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL generate cryptographically random recovery codes (minimum 128 bits entropy)
Applicability
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R6.4a — SHALL notify users of all recovery attemptsClause 5.6
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL notify users of all recovery attempts
Applicability
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R6.4b — SHALL limit recovery code usage attemptsClause 5.6
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL limit recovery code usage attempts
Applicability
Capability: Backup creation and account recovery mechanisms for disaster recovery scenarios.
Condition: Recovery mechanisms that bypass normal security controls or create alternative access paths.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.7 — Password Generation
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
Threat:
- T7.1: Predictable password generation enabling pre-computation attacks
- T7.2: Insufficient entropy in generated passwords
- T7.3: Side-channel leakage of generation parameters
- T7.4: Compromise of random number generator state
Risk: MEDIUM - Weak password generation undermines security premise. Likelihood depends on implementation quality.
R7.1 — SHALL use cryptographically secure random number generator (CSRNG)Clause 5.7
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use cryptographically secure random number generator (CSRNG)
Applicability
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R7.2 — SHALL provide minimum acceptable bits of entropy for generated passwordsClause 5.7
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL provide minimum acceptable bits of entropy for generated passwords
Applicability
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R7.3 — SHALL allow user-defined generation parametersClause 5.7
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL allow user-defined generation parameters
Applicability
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R7.4 — SHALL implement secure random seed initializationClause 5.7
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement secure random seed initialization
Applicability
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R7.5 — SHALL NOT store or log generated passwords before user acceptanceClause 5.7
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL NOT store or log generated passwords before user acceptance
Applicability
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R7.6 — SHALL implement constant-time generation to prevent timing analysisClause 5.7
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement constant-time generation to prevent timing analysis
Applicability
Capability: Cryptographically secure random password generation with configurable parameters.
Condition: Password generator using predictable or weak randomness sources.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.8 — Workload Isolation
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
Threat:
- T8.1: Cross-workload memory access violations
- T8.2: Execution state interference between processes
- T8.3: Isolation boundary escape leading to privilege escalation
- T8.4: Side-channel attacks between isolated components
Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity, confidentiality, and authorization controls. Enables lateral movement between security domains.
R8.1a — SHALL enforce process isolation using OS-level security boundariesClause 5.8
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce process isolation using OS-level security boundaries
Applicability
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R8.1b — SHALL prevent unauthorized inter-process communicationClause 5.8
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL prevent unauthorized inter-process communication
Applicability
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R8.2 — SHALL implement separate memory spaces for each workloadClause 5.8
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement separate memory spaces for each workload
Applicability
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R8.3a — SHALL enforce network segmentation between administrative and user functionsClause 5.8
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce network segmentation between administrative and user functions
Applicability
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R8.3b — SHALL monitor and alert on isolation violation attemptsClause 5.8
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL monitor and alert on isolation violation attempts
Applicability
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R8.4b — SHALL implement side-channel resistant isolation (cache partitioning, timing isolation)Clause 5.8
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement side-channel resistant isolation (cache partitioning, timing isolation)
Applicability
Capability: Isolation enforcement between concurrent workloads, administrative functions, and network domains.
Condition: Inadequate separation between concurrently executing workloads (e.g., remote synchronisation and secret injection).
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.9 — Platform Integrity
Capability: Runtime and at-rest integrity protection for platform components and workloads.
Condition: Insufficient protection of user interface or memory buffers against tampering.
Threat:
- T9.1: Code injection through UI manipulation
- T9.2: Memory buffer overflow attacks
- T9.3: Binary patching of core components
- T9.4: Configuration file tampering
Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity and authorization mechanisms. Enables persistent malware installation.
R9.1a — SHALL implement code signing for all executable componentsClause 5.9
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement code signing for all executable components
Applicability
Capability: Runtime and at-rest integrity protection for platform components and workloads.
Condition: Insufficient protection of user interface or memory buffers against tampering.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R9.1b — SHALL perform runtime integrity checks on critical functionsClause 5.9
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL perform runtime integrity checks on critical functions
Applicability
Capability: Runtime and at-rest integrity protection for platform components and workloads.
Condition: Insufficient protection of user interface or memory buffers against tampering.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R9.2 — SHALL use address space layout randomization (ASLR)Clause 5.9
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use address space layout randomization (ASLR)
Applicability
Capability: Runtime and at-rest integrity protection for platform components and workloads.
Condition: Insufficient protection of user interface or memory buffers against tampering.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R9.3 — SHALL implement buffer overflow protectionsClause 5.9
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement buffer overflow protections
Applicability
Capability: Runtime and at-rest integrity protection for platform components and workloads.
Condition: Insufficient protection of user interface or memory buffers against tampering.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R9.4 — SHALL maintain cryptographic hashes of configuration filesClause 5.9
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain cryptographic hashes of configuration files
Applicability
Capability: Runtime and at-rest integrity protection for platform components and workloads.
Condition: Insufficient protection of user interface or memory buffers against tampering.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.10 — Platform Attestation
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
Threat:
- T10.1: Compromised platform masquerading as trustworthy
- T10.2: Man-in-the-middle attacks on attestation protocols
- T10.3: Replay attacks using old attestation tokens
- T10.4: Attestation bypass through component substitution
Risk: HIGH - Undermines entire trust chain. External systems may trust compromised platforms.
R10.1 — SHALL generate cryptographically signed attestation reportsClause 5.10
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL generate cryptographically signed attestation reports
Applicability
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R10.2a — SHALL include all security-critical components in attestationClause 5.10
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL include all security-critical components in attestation
Applicability
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R10.2b — SHALL support remote attestation verificationClause 5.10
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support remote attestation verification
Applicability
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R10.3 — SHALL use hardware-backed attestation where availableClause 5.10
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use hardware-backed attestation where available
Applicability
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R10.4a — SHALL implement attestation freshness mechanismsClause 5.10
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement attestation freshness mechanisms
Applicability
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R10.4b — SHALL use mutual authentication for attestation protocolsClause 5.10
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use mutual authentication for attestation protocols
Applicability
Capability: Verifiable integrity attestation mechanism for trust establishment.
Condition: Absence of verifiable integrity evidence or attestation mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.11 — Administrative Authentication
Capability: Strong authentication for administrative interfaces and sensitive operations.
Condition: Missing or weak authentication mechanisms for critical functions.
Threat:
- T11.1: Unauthorized vault access through weak authentication
- T11.2: Privilege escalation via authentication bypass
- T11.3: Session hijacking of administrative sessions
- T11.4: Credential reuse attacks
Risk: CRITICAL - Full control of password manager and all stored secrets. Direct path to complete compromise.
R11.1 — SHALL enforce multi-factor authentication for administrative accessClause 5.11
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce multi-factor authentication for administrative access
Applicability
Capability: Strong authentication for administrative interfaces and sensitive operations.
Condition: Missing or weak authentication mechanisms for critical functions.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R11.2 — SHALL implement certificate-based authentication optionClause 5.11
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement certificate-based authentication option
Applicability
Capability: Strong authentication for administrative interfaces and sensitive operations.
Condition: Missing or weak authentication mechanisms for critical functions.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R11.3 — SHALL enforce session timeout and re-authenticationClause 5.11
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce session timeout and re-authentication
Applicability
Capability: Strong authentication for administrative interfaces and sensitive operations.
Condition: Missing or weak authentication mechanisms for critical functions.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R11.4a — SHALL use separate authentication credentials for administrative functionsClause 5.11
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use separate authentication credentials for administrative functions
Applicability
Capability: Strong authentication for administrative interfaces and sensitive operations.
Condition: Missing or weak authentication mechanisms for critical functions.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R11.4b — SHALL implement account lockout after failed attemptsClause 5.11
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement account lockout after failed attempts
Applicability
Capability: Strong authentication for administrative interfaces and sensitive operations.
Condition: Missing or weak authentication mechanisms for critical functions.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.12 — Access Control
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
Threat:
- T12.1: Unauthorized access to shared account credentials
- T12.2: Privilege escalation within the application
- T12.3: Bypassing access controls through API manipulation
- T12.4: Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTTOU) vulnerabilities
Risk: HIGH - Enables unauthorized access to credentials beyond intended scope. Breaks compartmentalization.
R12.1 — SHALL implement role-based access control (RBAC)Clause 5.12
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement role-based access control (RBAC)
Applicability
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R12.2a — SHALL enforce least privilege principle for all operationsClause 5.12
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce least privilege principle for all operations
Applicability
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R12.2b — SHALL validate authorization for each sensitive operationClause 5.12
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL validate authorization for each sensitive operation
Applicability
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R12.3a — SHALL support granular permission assignmentClause 5.12
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support granular permission assignment
Applicability
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R12.3b — SHALL log all authorization decisions and violationsClause 5.12
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL log all authorization decisions and violations
Applicability
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R12.4 — SHALL implement atomic authorization checks to prevent TOCTTOUClause 5.12
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement atomic authorization checks to prevent TOCTTOU
Applicability
Capability: Authorization and access control enforcement for functions and data.
Condition: Missing or weak authorization mechanisms within the password manager.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.13 — Data Confidentiality
Capability: Comprehensive encryption for data at rest and in transit.
Condition: Insufficient encryption enforcement, compromised storage, or inadequate network isolation.
Threat:
- T13.1: Local vault exposure through file system access
- T13.2: Network interception during synchronization
- T13.3: Memory dump exposure of decrypted credentials
- T13.4: Cache and temporary file recovery
Risk: CRITICAL - Direct exposure of all stored credentials. Catastrophic impact on user security.
R13.1 — SHALL encrypt all data at rest using AES-256 or equivalentClause 5.13
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL encrypt all data at rest using AES-256 or equivalent
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive encryption for data at rest and in transit.
Condition: Insufficient encryption enforcement, compromised storage, or inadequate network isolation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R13.2 — SHALL use TLS 1.3 for all network communicationsClause 5.13
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use TLS 1.3 for all network communications
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive encryption for data at rest and in transit.
Condition: Insufficient encryption enforcement, compromised storage, or inadequate network isolation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R13.3 — SHALL implement perfect forward secrecy for communicationsClause 5.13
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement perfect forward secrecy for communications
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive encryption for data at rest and in transit.
Condition: Insufficient encryption enforcement, compromised storage, or inadequate network isolation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R13.4a — SHALL clear sensitive data from memory after useClause 5.13
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL clear sensitive data from memory after use
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive encryption for data at rest and in transit.
Condition: Insufficient encryption enforcement, compromised storage, or inadequate network isolation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R13.4b — SHALL disable caching of decrypted credentialsClause 5.13
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL disable caching of decrypted credentials
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive encryption for data at rest and in transit.
Condition: Insufficient encryption enforcement, compromised storage, or inadequate network isolation.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.14 — Availability Protection
Capability: Resilience against denial of service and resource exhaustion attacks.
Condition: Insufficient protection against resource exhaustion or overwhelming request volumes.
Threat:
- T14.1: API flooding causing service unavailability
- T14.2: Resource exhaustion through memory leaks
- T14.3: CPU exhaustion through computational attacks
- T14.4: Storage exhaustion through log flooding
Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents access to credentials when needed. Critical during incident response scenarios.
R14.1 — SHALL implement rate limiting on all interfacesClause 5.14
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement rate limiting on all interfaces
Applicability
Capability: Resilience against denial of service and resource exhaustion attacks.
Condition: Insufficient protection against resource exhaustion or overwhelming request volumes.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R14.2a — SHALL enforce resource quotas per user/sessionClause 5.14
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce resource quotas per user/session
Applicability
Capability: Resilience against denial of service and resource exhaustion attacks.
Condition: Insufficient protection against resource exhaustion or overwhelming request volumes.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R14.2b — SHALL implement automatic resource cleanupClause 5.14
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement automatic resource cleanup
Applicability
Capability: Resilience against denial of service and resource exhaustion attacks.
Condition: Insufficient protection against resource exhaustion or overwhelming request volumes.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R14.3 — SHALL support graceful degradation under loadClause 5.14
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support graceful degradation under load
Applicability
Capability: Resilience against denial of service and resource exhaustion attacks.
Condition: Insufficient protection against resource exhaustion or overwhelming request volumes.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R14.4 — SHALL maintain service availability monitoringClause 5.14
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain service availability monitoring
Applicability
Capability: Resilience against denial of service and resource exhaustion attacks.
Condition: Insufficient protection against resource exhaustion or overwhelming request volumes.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.15 — Audit Logging
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
Threat:
- T15.1: Undetected unauthorized access attempts
- T15.2: Log tampering to hide malicious activities
- T15.3: Log deletion to prevent forensic analysis
- T15.4: Log flooding to obscure attacks
Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents detection and investigation of security incidents. Enables persistent threats.
R15.1 — SHALL log all authentication attempts and outcomesClause 5.15
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL log all authentication attempts and outcomes
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R15.2 — SHALL log all credential access and modificationsClause 5.15
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL log all credential access and modifications
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R15.3a — SHALL implement tamper-evident log storageClause 5.15
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement tamper-evident log storage
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R15.3b — SHALL support secure log export and archivalClause 5.15
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support secure log export and archival
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R15.4a — SHALL implement log retention policiesClause 5.15
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement log retention policies
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R15.4b — SHALL implement log rotation and size limits to prevent floodingClause 5.15
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement log rotation and size limits to prevent flooding
Applicability
Capability: Comprehensive security logging with integrity protection.
Condition: Insufficient logging capabilities or unprotected log storage.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.16 — Update Security
Capability: Secure update and patch management mechanisms.
Condition: Lack of cryptographic validation or rollback protection for updates.
Threat:
- T16.1: Malicious update injection
- T16.2: Update replay attacks with vulnerable versions
- T16.3: Update corruption causing system instability
- T16.4: Rollback attacks to reintroduce vulnerabilities
Risk: HIGH - Compromises entire system integrity. Enables persistent backdoor installation.
R16.1a — SHALL cryptographically sign all update packagesClause 5.16
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL cryptographically sign all update packages
Applicability
Capability: Secure update and patch management mechanisms.
Condition: Lack of cryptographic validation or rollback protection for updates.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R16.1b — SHALL verify signatures before applying updatesClause 5.16
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL verify signatures before applying updates
Applicability
Capability: Secure update and patch management mechanisms.
Condition: Lack of cryptographic validation or rollback protection for updates.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R16.2 — SHALL implement secure rollback mechanismsClause 5.16
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement secure rollback mechanisms
Applicability
Capability: Secure update and patch management mechanisms.
Condition: Lack of cryptographic validation or rollback protection for updates.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R16.3 — SHALL maintain update audit trailClause 5.16
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain update audit trail
Applicability
Capability: Secure update and patch management mechanisms.
Condition: Lack of cryptographic validation or rollback protection for updates.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R16.4 — SHALL include version checking to prevent downgrade attacksClause 5.16
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL include version checking to prevent downgrade attacks
Applicability
Capability: Secure update and patch management mechanisms.
Condition: Lack of cryptographic validation or rollback protection for updates.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.17 — Configuration Security
Capability: Protected configuration management and change control.
Condition: Insufficient protection of configuration interfaces or files.
Threat:
- T17.1: Unauthorized security setting modifications
- T17.2: Configuration injection attacks
- T17.3: Privilege escalation through configuration manipulation
- T17.4: Configuration drift from secure baseline
Risk: HIGH - Weakens overall security posture. Enables bypass of security controls.
R17.1a — SHALL protect configuration files with appropriate permissionsClause 5.17
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL protect configuration files with appropriate permissions
Applicability
Capability: Protected configuration management and change control.
Condition: Insufficient protection of configuration interfaces or files.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R17.1b — SHALL require authentication for configuration changesClause 5.17
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL require authentication for configuration changes
Applicability
Capability: Protected configuration management and change control.
Condition: Insufficient protection of configuration interfaces or files.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R17.2 — SHALL validate all configuration inputsClause 5.17
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL validate all configuration inputs
Applicability
Capability: Protected configuration management and change control.
Condition: Insufficient protection of configuration interfaces or files.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R17.3 — SHALL maintain configuration change historyClause 5.17
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain configuration change history
Applicability
Capability: Protected configuration management and change control.
Condition: Insufficient protection of configuration interfaces or files.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R17.4 — SHALL support configuration integrity monitoringClause 5.17
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL support configuration integrity monitoring
Applicability
Capability: Protected configuration management and change control.
Condition: Insufficient protection of configuration interfaces or files.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.18 — Secure Defaults
Capability: Security-by-default configuration and minimal attack surface. [Hard requirement of the Regulation]
Condition: Product shipped with insecure default settings requiring manual hardening.
Threat:
- T18.1: Default credentials enabling immediate compromise
- T18.2: Unnecessary services exposed by default
- T18.3: Weak cryptographic defaults
- T18.4: Overly permissive default access controls
Risk: MEDIUM - Many deployments never change defaults. Provides easy initial compromise vector.
R18.1a — SHALL enforce secure defaults without user interventionClause 5.18
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL enforce secure defaults without user intervention
Applicability
Capability: Security-by-default configuration and minimal attack surface. [Hard requirement of the Regulation]
Condition: Product shipped with insecure default settings requiring manual hardening.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R18.1b — SHALL require password change on first useClause 5.18
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL require password change on first use
Applicability
Capability: Security-by-default configuration and minimal attack surface. [Hard requirement of the Regulation]
Condition: Product shipped with insecure default settings requiring manual hardening.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R18.2 — SHALL disable unnecessary features by defaultClause 5.18
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL disable unnecessary features by default
Applicability
Capability: Security-by-default configuration and minimal attack surface. [Hard requirement of the Regulation]
Condition: Product shipped with insecure default settings requiring manual hardening.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R18.3 — SHALL use strongest available cryptography by defaultClause 5.18
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use strongest available cryptography by default
Applicability
Capability: Security-by-default configuration and minimal attack surface. [Hard requirement of the Regulation]
Condition: Product shipped with insecure default settings requiring manual hardening.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R18.4 — SHALL provide security hardening guideClause 5.18
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL provide security hardening guide
Applicability
Capability: Security-by-default configuration and minimal attack surface. [Hard requirement of the Regulation]
Condition: Product shipped with insecure default settings requiring manual hardening.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
5.19 — Time Synchronization
Capability: Accurate and secure time synchronization for security operations.
Condition: Unprotected or unreliable time source mechanisms.
Threat:
- T19.1: Log timestamp manipulation hiding attack timeline
- T19.2: Token expiry bypass through time manipulation
- T19.3: Certificate validation bypass via time shifting
- T19.4: Password rotation schedule disruption
Risk: MEDIUM - Undermines time-based security controls. Complicates incident investigation.
R19.1 — SHALL use authenticated NTP or equivalent protocolClause 5.19
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL use authenticated NTP or equivalent protocol
Applicability
Capability: Accurate and secure time synchronization for security operations.
Condition: Unprotected or unreliable time source mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R19.2a — SHALL validate time source authenticityClause 5.19
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL validate time source authenticity
Applicability
Capability: Accurate and secure time synchronization for security operations.
Condition: Unprotected or unreliable time source mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R19.2b — SHALL detect and alert on significant time changesClause 5.19
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL detect and alert on significant time changes
Applicability
Capability: Accurate and secure time synchronization for security operations.
Condition: Unprotected or unreliable time source mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R19.3 — SHALL maintain monotonic clock for security eventsClause 5.19
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL maintain monotonic clock for security events
Applicability
Capability: Accurate and secure time synchronization for security operations.
Condition: Unprotected or unreliable time source mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
R19.4 — SHALL implement time synchronization monitoringClause 5.19
Requirement (verbatim from the interim draft)
SHALL implement time synchronization monitoring
Applicability
Capability: Accurate and secure time synchronization for security operations.
Condition: Unprotected or unreliable time source mechanisms.
This interim draft contains no assessment block for this requirement. Recorded in the draft gaps.
Correspondence to the CRA
The draft’s own correspondence table: which of its clauses address which essential requirement of CRA Annex I. This is the draft’s claim, reproduced as it stands — not Vandorisk’s judgment of coverage, and (status block above) not a presumption of conformity.
Where the table covers CRA Annex I Part 1 only, the Part 2 (vulnerability handling) obligations remain assessed through the horizontal CRA pack(II.1–II.8).
Threat catalogue
The 76 threats the draft derives its requirements against, verbatim:
T1.1 — Offline brute force attacks against encrypted vaults
Identified in clause 5.1 (Master Password Authentication). Risk: HIGH - Compromise of master password provides complete access to all stored credentials. Likelihood elevated due to targeted nature of password manager attacks.
T1.2 — Online credential stuffing and password spraying attacks
Identified in clause 5.1 (Master Password Authentication). Risk: HIGH - Compromise of master password provides complete access to all stored credentials. Likelihood elevated due to targeted nature of password manager attacks.
T1.3 — Shoulder surfing and keylogger-based credential theft
Identified in clause 5.1 (Master Password Authentication). Risk: HIGH - Compromise of master password provides complete access to all stored credentials. Likelihood elevated due to targeted nature of password manager attacks.
T1.4 — Memory scraping attacks targeting master password in RAM
Identified in clause 5.1 (Master Password Authentication). Risk: HIGH - Compromise of master password provides complete access to all stored credentials. Likelihood elevated due to targeted nature of password manager attacks.
T2.1 — Database exfiltration through file system access
Identified in clause 5.2 (Password Database Storage). Risk: CRITICAL - Database contains all user credentials. Impact is catastrophic if encryption is compromised.
T2.2 — Man-in-the-middle attacks during cloud synchronization
Identified in clause 5.2 (Password Database Storage). Risk: CRITICAL - Database contains all user credentials. Impact is catastrophic if encryption is compromised.
T2.3 — Cryptographic downgrade attacks
Identified in clause 5.2 (Password Database Storage). Risk: CRITICAL - Database contains all user credentials. Impact is catastrophic if encryption is compromised.
T2.4 — Side-channel attacks against encryption implementation
Identified in clause 5.2 (Password Database Storage). Risk: CRITICAL - Database contains all user credentials. Impact is catastrophic if encryption is compromised.
T3.1 — Phishing attacks through lookalike domains
Identified in clause 5.3 (Auto-fill Functionality). Risk: HIGH - Auto-fill vulnerabilities enable credential theft at scale. Likelihood high due to prevalence of phishing.
T3.2 — Clickjacking to trigger unintended auto-fill
Identified in clause 5.3 (Auto-fill Functionality). Risk: HIGH - Auto-fill vulnerabilities enable credential theft at scale. Likelihood high due to prevalence of phishing.
T3.3 — Form injection attacks on compromised sites
Identified in clause 5.3 (Auto-fill Functionality). Risk: HIGH - Auto-fill vulnerabilities enable credential theft at scale. Likelihood high due to prevalence of phishing.
T3.4 — Cross-site scripting (XSS) credential theft
Identified in clause 5.3 (Auto-fill Functionality). Risk: HIGH - Auto-fill vulnerabilities enable credential theft at scale. Likelihood high due to prevalence of phishing.
T4.1 — Plaintext credential exposure during export
Identified in clause 5.4 (Import/Export Functionality). Risk: MEDIUM - Feature typically used infrequently but presents data exposure risk. Impact high if exploited.
T4.2 — Malicious data injection through crafted import files
Identified in clause 5.4 (Import/Export Functionality). Risk: MEDIUM - Feature typically used infrequently but presents data exposure risk. Impact high if exploited.
T4.3 — Format confusion attacks
Identified in clause 5.4 (Import/Export Functionality). Risk: MEDIUM - Feature typically used infrequently but presents data exposure risk. Impact high if exploited.
T4.4 — Temporary file forensic recovery
Identified in clause 5.4 (Import/Export Functionality). Risk: MEDIUM - Feature typically used infrequently but presents data exposure risk. Impact high if exploited.
T5.1 — Automated credential harvesting via API
Identified in clause 5.5 (API/CLI Access). Risk: HIGH - APIs present expanded attack surface. Automation enables rapid exploitation at scale.
T5.2 — Privilege escalation through API vulnerabilities
Identified in clause 5.5 (API/CLI Access). Risk: HIGH - APIs present expanded attack surface. Automation enables rapid exploitation at scale.
T5.3 — Token/session hijacking
Identified in clause 5.5 (API/CLI Access). Risk: HIGH - APIs present expanded attack surface. Automation enables rapid exploitation at scale.
T5.4 — Denial of service through resource exhaustion
Identified in clause 5.5 (API/CLI Access). Risk: HIGH - APIs present expanded attack surface. Automation enables rapid exploitation at scale.
T6.1 — Account takeover through weak recovery processes
Identified in clause 5.6 (Backup and Recovery). Risk: HIGH - Recovery mechanisms are frequently targeted as the weakest link. Impact equals full account compromise.
T6.2 — Backup data exposure in less secure locations
Identified in clause 5.6 (Backup and Recovery). Risk: HIGH - Recovery mechanisms are frequently targeted as the weakest link. Impact equals full account compromise.
T6.3 — Social engineering targeting recovery procedures
Identified in clause 5.6 (Backup and Recovery). Risk: HIGH - Recovery mechanisms are frequently targeted as the weakest link. Impact equals full account compromise.
T6.4 — Recovery code interception or prediction
Identified in clause 5.6 (Backup and Recovery). Risk: HIGH - Recovery mechanisms are frequently targeted as the weakest link. Impact equals full account compromise.
T7.1 — Predictable password generation enabling pre-computation attacks
Identified in clause 5.7 (Password Generation). Risk: MEDIUM - Weak password generation undermines security premise. Likelihood depends on implementation quality.
T7.2 — Insufficient entropy in generated passwords
Identified in clause 5.7 (Password Generation). Risk: MEDIUM - Weak password generation undermines security premise. Likelihood depends on implementation quality.
T7.3 — Side-channel leakage of generation parameters
Identified in clause 5.7 (Password Generation). Risk: MEDIUM - Weak password generation undermines security premise. Likelihood depends on implementation quality.
T7.4 — Compromise of random number generator state
Identified in clause 5.7 (Password Generation). Risk: MEDIUM - Weak password generation undermines security premise. Likelihood depends on implementation quality.
T8.1 — Cross-workload memory access violations
Identified in clause 5.8 (Workload Isolation). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity, confidentiality, and authorization controls. Enables lateral movement between security domains.
T8.2 — Execution state interference between processes
Identified in clause 5.8 (Workload Isolation). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity, confidentiality, and authorization controls. Enables lateral movement between security domains.
T8.3 — Isolation boundary escape leading to privilege escalation
Identified in clause 5.8 (Workload Isolation). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity, confidentiality, and authorization controls. Enables lateral movement between security domains.
T8.4 — Side-channel attacks between isolated components
Identified in clause 5.8 (Workload Isolation). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity, confidentiality, and authorization controls. Enables lateral movement between security domains.
T9.1 — Code injection through UI manipulation
Identified in clause 5.9 (Platform Integrity). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity and authorization mechanisms. Enables persistent malware installation.
T9.2 — Memory buffer overflow attacks
Identified in clause 5.9 (Platform Integrity). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity and authorization mechanisms. Enables persistent malware installation.
T9.3 — Binary patching of core components
Identified in clause 5.9 (Platform Integrity). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity and authorization mechanisms. Enables persistent malware installation.
T9.4 — Configuration file tampering
Identified in clause 5.9 (Platform Integrity). Risk: HIGH - Compromises integrity and authorization mechanisms. Enables persistent malware installation.
T10.1 — Compromised platform masquerading as trustworthy
Identified in clause 5.10 (Platform Attestation). Risk: HIGH - Undermines entire trust chain. External systems may trust compromised platforms.
T10.2 — Man-in-the-middle attacks on attestation protocols
Identified in clause 5.10 (Platform Attestation). Risk: HIGH - Undermines entire trust chain. External systems may trust compromised platforms.
T10.3 — Replay attacks using old attestation tokens
Identified in clause 5.10 (Platform Attestation). Risk: HIGH - Undermines entire trust chain. External systems may trust compromised platforms.
T10.4 — Attestation bypass through component substitution
Identified in clause 5.10 (Platform Attestation). Risk: HIGH - Undermines entire trust chain. External systems may trust compromised platforms.
T11.1 — Unauthorized vault access through weak authentication
Identified in clause 5.11 (Administrative Authentication). Risk: CRITICAL - Full control of password manager and all stored secrets. Direct path to complete compromise.
T11.2 — Privilege escalation via authentication bypass
Identified in clause 5.11 (Administrative Authentication). Risk: CRITICAL - Full control of password manager and all stored secrets. Direct path to complete compromise.
T11.3 — Session hijacking of administrative sessions
Identified in clause 5.11 (Administrative Authentication). Risk: CRITICAL - Full control of password manager and all stored secrets. Direct path to complete compromise.
T11.4 — Credential reuse attacks
Identified in clause 5.11 (Administrative Authentication). Risk: CRITICAL - Full control of password manager and all stored secrets. Direct path to complete compromise.
T12.1 — Unauthorized access to shared account credentials
Identified in clause 5.12 (Access Control). Risk: HIGH - Enables unauthorized access to credentials beyond intended scope. Breaks compartmentalization.
T12.2 — Privilege escalation within the application
Identified in clause 5.12 (Access Control). Risk: HIGH - Enables unauthorized access to credentials beyond intended scope. Breaks compartmentalization.
T12.3 — Bypassing access controls through API manipulation
Identified in clause 5.12 (Access Control). Risk: HIGH - Enables unauthorized access to credentials beyond intended scope. Breaks compartmentalization.
T12.4 — Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTTOU) vulnerabilities
Identified in clause 5.12 (Access Control). Risk: HIGH - Enables unauthorized access to credentials beyond intended scope. Breaks compartmentalization.
T13.1 — Local vault exposure through file system access
Identified in clause 5.13 (Data Confidentiality). Risk: CRITICAL - Direct exposure of all stored credentials. Catastrophic impact on user security.
T13.2 — Network interception during synchronization
Identified in clause 5.13 (Data Confidentiality). Risk: CRITICAL - Direct exposure of all stored credentials. Catastrophic impact on user security.
T13.3 — Memory dump exposure of decrypted credentials
Identified in clause 5.13 (Data Confidentiality). Risk: CRITICAL - Direct exposure of all stored credentials. Catastrophic impact on user security.
T13.4 — Cache and temporary file recovery
Identified in clause 5.13 (Data Confidentiality). Risk: CRITICAL - Direct exposure of all stored credentials. Catastrophic impact on user security.
T14.1 — API flooding causing service unavailability
Identified in clause 5.14 (Availability Protection). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents access to credentials when needed. Critical during incident response scenarios.
T14.2 — Resource exhaustion through memory leaks
Identified in clause 5.14 (Availability Protection). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents access to credentials when needed. Critical during incident response scenarios.
T14.3 — CPU exhaustion through computational attacks
Identified in clause 5.14 (Availability Protection). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents access to credentials when needed. Critical during incident response scenarios.
T14.4 — Storage exhaustion through log flooding
Identified in clause 5.14 (Availability Protection). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents access to credentials when needed. Critical during incident response scenarios.
T15.1 — Undetected unauthorized access attempts
Identified in clause 5.15 (Audit Logging). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents detection and investigation of security incidents. Enables persistent threats.
T15.2 — Log tampering to hide malicious activities
Identified in clause 5.15 (Audit Logging). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents detection and investigation of security incidents. Enables persistent threats.
T15.3 — Log deletion to prevent forensic analysis
Identified in clause 5.15 (Audit Logging). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents detection and investigation of security incidents. Enables persistent threats.
T15.4 — Log flooding to obscure attacks
Identified in clause 5.15 (Audit Logging). Risk: MEDIUM - Prevents detection and investigation of security incidents. Enables persistent threats.
T16.1 — Malicious update injection
Identified in clause 5.16 (Update Security). Risk: HIGH - Compromises entire system integrity. Enables persistent backdoor installation.
T16.2 — Update replay attacks with vulnerable versions
Identified in clause 5.16 (Update Security). Risk: HIGH - Compromises entire system integrity. Enables persistent backdoor installation.
T16.3 — Update corruption causing system instability
Identified in clause 5.16 (Update Security). Risk: HIGH - Compromises entire system integrity. Enables persistent backdoor installation.
T16.4 — Rollback attacks to reintroduce vulnerabilities
Identified in clause 5.16 (Update Security). Risk: HIGH - Compromises entire system integrity. Enables persistent backdoor installation.
T17.1 — Unauthorized security setting modifications
Identified in clause 5.17 (Configuration Security). Risk: HIGH - Weakens overall security posture. Enables bypass of security controls.
T17.2 — Configuration injection attacks
Identified in clause 5.17 (Configuration Security). Risk: HIGH - Weakens overall security posture. Enables bypass of security controls.
T17.3 — Privilege escalation through configuration manipulation
Identified in clause 5.17 (Configuration Security). Risk: HIGH - Weakens overall security posture. Enables bypass of security controls.
T17.4 — Configuration drift from secure baseline
Identified in clause 5.17 (Configuration Security). Risk: HIGH - Weakens overall security posture. Enables bypass of security controls.
T18.1 — Default credentials enabling immediate compromise
Identified in clause 5.18 (Secure Defaults). Risk: MEDIUM - Many deployments never change defaults. Provides easy initial compromise vector.
T18.2 — Unnecessary services exposed by default
Identified in clause 5.18 (Secure Defaults). Risk: MEDIUM - Many deployments never change defaults. Provides easy initial compromise vector.
T18.3 — Weak cryptographic defaults
Identified in clause 5.18 (Secure Defaults). Risk: MEDIUM - Many deployments never change defaults. Provides easy initial compromise vector.
T18.4 — Overly permissive default access controls
Identified in clause 5.18 (Secure Defaults). Risk: MEDIUM - Many deployments never change defaults. Provides easy initial compromise vector.
T19.1 — Log timestamp manipulation hiding attack timeline
Identified in clause 5.19 (Time Synchronization). Risk: MEDIUM - Undermines time-based security controls. Complicates incident investigation.
T19.2 — Token expiry bypass through time manipulation
Identified in clause 5.19 (Time Synchronization). Risk: MEDIUM - Undermines time-based security controls. Complicates incident investigation.
T19.3 — Certificate validation bypass via time shifting
Identified in clause 5.19 (Time Synchronization). Risk: MEDIUM - Undermines time-based security controls. Complicates incident investigation.
T19.4 — Password rotation schedule disruption
Identified in clause 5.19 (Time Synchronization). Risk: MEDIUM - Undermines time-based security controls. Complicates incident investigation.
Draft gaps
Defects and holes we found in the interim draft while building this pack — recorded rather than papered over; they will be rechecked against each new draft. A standard under consultation is allowed to have holes. A pack that hides them is not.
- This interim draft contains NO assessment criteria anywhere: there is no clause 6 and no per-requirement assessment/conformance section (the skeleton's Annex E/F risk-methodology annexes are unfilled template placeholders). All 105 requirements therefore carry assessment: null — the standard's evidence-collection method does not exist yet.
- Requirement id scheme: the draft defines its own per-topic bullet ids R1.1–R19.4 (with a/b variants, e.g. R1.5a) instead of the REQ-PP-ESR-NNN convention other stan4cra drafts use; the pack uses those R ids verbatim, with clauseRef recording the containing clause (5.1–5.19).
- Id-sequence irregularities in the draft: clause 5.2 defines R2.2 and R2.2b but no R2.2a; clause 5.8 defines R8.4b but no R8.4a.
- Annex ZA/ZB correspondence tables reference four ids clause 5 never defines: R2.5, R5.1 (only R5.1a/R5.1b exist), R6.5 and R13.4c. The craMap rows carry the tables verbatim, dangling references included.
- No per-use-case applicability mapping exists: clause 4.4.3 defines six use cases (UC-PM1–UC-PM6) with risk levels, but no matrix ties requirements to them. Every requirement carries an empty applicability map plus the verbatim Capability/Condition prose of its topic as applicabilityText.
- Clause 4.4.1 (Universal Security Requirements) contains five normative SHALL controls with no requirement ids; they are carried verbatim in applicabilityIntro, not as answerable requirement rows.
- Annex L (the formal CRA relationship annex) is marked “DRAFT ANNEX L - DO NOT CONSIDER THE CONTENT”; the craMap is taken from the informative Annex ZA table instead.
- Annex ZA's second table (“Compliance Mapping to CRA Annex I (Daniel's sketch with commentary)”) uses CRA Annex I reference numbering inconsistent with the regulation (e.g. “Part I, 1(a) - Secure by default”); it is not extracted.
- Threats are the per-topic T1.1–T19.4 bullets (76 entries, extracted); Annex E (risk identification) and Annex F (risk evaluation) are empty template placeholders.
- Structural draft defects: two different clauses are both numbered 4.1 (“Password Manager” and “Scope Boundaries”); clauses 4.1/4.3/4.5 sit at top level instead of under clause 4; “Annex C” appears twice; the Foreword still carries Group-Report boilerplate (“This Group Report (GR) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification Group…”); the version field is an unfilled {{VERSION}} placeholder.
- The Modal verbs clause omits “shall”/“shall not” from the list of interpreted verbs even though every requirement uses SHALL.
- Requirements embed specific technical parameters that the executive summary says will be tiered by implementation priority (critical / six-month / medium), but no such tiering appears in the normative text.
How this pack is built, and corrections
The pack is produced by a deterministic parser over the vendored draft text pinned in the source card— no model writes or rewrites any requirement. When ETSI updates the draft, the pack is rebuilt from the new text, the draft gaps are rechecked, and the result ships as a new pack version — never a silent edit.
The interim draft and, once published, the standard itself are the authoritative texts — this pack reproduces and cites them, it does not replace them, and nothing on this page is legal advice. If you find an error — a mis-parsed requirement, an applicability entry that does not match the draft, a gap we missed — write to hello@vandorisk.com. The horizontal pack this one attaches alongside is published at /pack, with every tracked vertical standard listed there.